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Are Economic Kinds Natural? 
I 
This essay is primarily about some foundational problems in economic theory. 
I shall approach these problems by focusing on the natural kinds postulated in eco-
nomic theory and physical theory. I hope to develop some understanding of how 
we can think of natural kinds in scientific theories, but my main goal is to try to 
answer some more practical questions about the foundations of economics. In 
what follows, 'natural kinds' means natural kinds in the world-the kinds of things 
that there are. Furthermore, I do not mean the kinds of things that fall into the 
extensions of the so-called natural-kind terms of the vernacular. Instead, this es-
say is about the kinds of things that are picked out by our best scientific theories. 
Perhaps I am not justified in appropriating the term 'natural kind' in this way, but 
for the present it can be regarded as a stipulative definition. 1 
How do scientific theories pick out natural kinds? Let's assume that a scientific 
theory is a sort of linguistic object containing some items, natural-kind terms, that 
are semantically related to the natural kinds in the world. This assumption needs 
plenty of defending, but none will be provided here. Which items in the theory 
are the natural-kind terms? If we could identify within theories scientific laws of 
the form, "All Ps are lawfully associated with Qs," then it would be sensible to 
think of'P' and 'Q' as natural-kind terms. There are too many problems with this 
approach for us to count it a general analysis, but in this essay I shall concentrate 
on some real examples from physics and especially from economics for which 
the analysis has some plausibility. 
The particular question about economics dealt with in this essay is this: Why 
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does economics do so much worse than the physical sciences in applications when 
its formal structure often rivals the others with respect to mathematical sophisti-
cation, rigor, and aesthetic appeal?2 Many answers have been proposed. Pes-
simists say it is because social science is inherently impossible, or because con-
temporary economics surreptitiously incorporates bad ideology, or because it is 
simply a failure like phlogiston theory. Optimists say it is because it is a young 
science, or because the phenomena it attempts to deal with are so complex, or 
because we cannot run carefully controlled, repeatable experiments. 
I want to defend another answer that has both pessimistic and optimistic ele-
ments. I shall provide new arguments for the old pessimistic position that says 
there are very good reasons for supposing that economics does not apply to the 
world successfully because its central concepts do not represent natural kinds. 
The optimistic part comes from a characterization of the sorts of empirical results 
we would need to get in the future to show that the natural-kind terms of eco-
nomics do refer to natural kinds after all. I shall also have something to say about 
procedures that might be successful for obtaining these results. To begin the argu-
ment we require an account of what the natural-kind terms in economics are. 
II 
The economic theory I shall concentrate on is General Equilibrium Theory 
(GET). GET is about economies of individual, independent agents, both con-
sumers and producers of commodities. It analyzes economies with attention to the 
interdependence of the economic decisions they make. It is assumed for the sake 
of simplicity that decisions invariably eventuate in the intended economic actions 
(although these actions may not have all the intended results). The basic goal of 
the theory is to determine what configurations of relative prices of goods will 
yield outcomes consistent with rational behavior on the parts of all agents. The 
properties of these so-called equilibrium outcomes are then studied. It is called 
general equilibrium when the prices of all commodities are more or less constant. 
GET is especially appropriate for the purposes of this essay because of its great 
generality. Since almost all branches of contemporary capitalistically inspired 
economics are either forms of GET or special cases of it, 3 understanding it is 
close to understanding virtually all of modern academic economics. Moreover, 
GET is characterized by a fruitful and well-developed formalism, so there is little 
doubt that the empirical problems of economics are the result of a logically or 
mathematically defective formalism. It must be stressed, however, that the em-
pirical problems of economics do not result simply from clumsy attempts to apply 
the general and highly abstract mathematical formalism of GET to particular ac-
tual cases. Good empirical work is supposed to be, in principle, conformable to 
the GET framework, but almost everyone realizes that empirically useful results 
require careful extensions and applications of the basic GET framework. 
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The theory's structure can be briefly summarized as follows.4 It contains a 
small number of foundational elements. Each of these elements, or theoretical 
concepts, can be thought of as representing a natural kind. To understand them, 
it is necessary to study them together, because the concepts are closely 
intertwined. 
Consumers. These represent people-the principal agents in the economy. It 
is their actions, their exchanges of commodities, that determine the nature of most 
economic phenomena, including production. From the standpoint of GET and its 
special cases, individual consumers' identities consist solely of their preferences 
for and endowments of commodities, so one can think of them simply as reposito-
ries of preferences and endowments-they are not quite actual people. Thus their 
economically interesting actions consist of only exchanges of commodities that 
maximize utility (or perhaps tend to maximize utility, or perhaps exchanges that 
the consumer thinks maximize utility, and so on). It is also true of every consumer 
that he has the capacity to annihilate and create commodities by consuming and 
laboring, but the mechanisms that are involved in these activities are not part of 
the subject matter of economics. 
Preferences. Each consumer has preferences that put all of the bundles of com-
modities available to him in an order. 5 •6 They are represented in GET by an or-
dering of vectors having an element for each kind of commodity. Preferences are 
often conveniently represented by a utility function that assigns a scalar measure 
of utility to the consumer for every commodity vector. In virtually all cases of 
interest, use ofutility functions is equivalent to use of preferences, and I shall fol-
low economic practice in exploiting this fact. In particular, I shaH freely shift 
back and forth between utility functions and preferences, depending on which 
make the point in question more perspicuously. 7 
Endowments. Each consumer has an endowment, a bundle of commodities that 
she owns. 8 The endowment is represented by a vector of the same commodities 
as the preference vector. (Since few have everything that they like, some elements 
will be equal to zero.) How much utility a consumer "gets," how well her prefer-
ences are satisfied, depends on how much and on what commodities are in the 
endowment. These commodities include not only goods in the sense of "dry 
goods," but also claims to "services" of all kinds (TV repair, foot massages, musi-
cal performances, etc.). Perhaps the most important services owned by the con-
sumer are the ones that she can provide herself, in short, her labor. The endow-
ment, or parts of it, can be either exchanged on the market for other commodities, 
or consumed. 
Firms. Firms are organizations of people (i.e., consumers) and commodities 
(i.e., capital) that transform bundles of commodities into other, different bundles 
of commodities. The idea is that the firm employs "factors of production," labor 
and relatively raw materials, and produces "finished" commodities. In the same 
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way that consumers are fully characterized by their preferences, endowments, 
and propensity to maximize utility, firms are fully characterized by their techno-
logical possibilities for converting commodity inputs to commodity outputs-
their "production possibilities set." The stream of commodities produced by the 
firm is owned by a group of consumers, the stockholders-it becomes part of their 
endowments. Since consumers are utility maximizers, the firm's owners will di-
rect it to maximize output in a way that benefits the owners in terms of utility. 
Netput Vectors. The firm's production possibilities set can be represented by 
a set of vectors of quantities of commodities. The elements represent inputs and 
outputs of each commodity, hence the name. Each netput vector represents a 
production process that is technologically possible for the firm. If an element of 
one of these vectors is positive, that commodity is an output of the process (a 
product); if an element is negative, that commodity is an input (a factor of produc-
tion). It is often convenient to represent the set of netput vectors by a function 
that takes inputs of factors of production to outputs of product, a "production 
function." 
Prices, the Market, and Equilibrium. It is assumed that commodities exchange 
at prices that are standardized for the entire economy. Some elaborations of GET 
attempt to model the institution of fiat money (intrinsically worthless money like 
bank notes, as opposed to intrinsically valuable bullion), but in general a price 
is simply a relative rate of exchange-five avocados for three bananas. In the ab-
sence of fiat money we can, for the sake of simplicity, calculate all prices in terms 
of a "numeraire," for example "cost in number of avocados." A market is con-
stituted by the existence of a price system. It is usually, but not always, assumed 
that the price of finding exchange partners and then transacting exchanges is zero. 
Equilibrium is then said to obtain when the prices of commodities are such that 
quantities demanded equal quantities produced for every commodity because all 
consumers (including stockholders) achieve utility maxima by exchanging parts 
of their endowments at those prices. 
III 
Two concepts clearly emerge as the most fundamental from this way of laying 
out the structure of GET. One is the commodity. I did not give it its own paragraph 
because it is difficult to fully explicate in terms of the others (though one might 
say that commodities simply are the things that give consumers utility), but it was 
prominently featured in the explication of each of the other concepts. Consumers 
are exchangers of commodities. (And producers and annihilators of them, though 
these processes are not objects of economic scrutiny.) Preferences are for com-
modities. Utility functions are from quantities of commodities to an index ofutil-
ity. Endowments are of commodities. Firms transform some commodities into 
others. Netput vectors are of quantities of commodities, and production functions 
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are from quantities of commodities to quantities of commodities. Equilibrium ob-
tains when all agents' plans for doing things with commodities are mutually con-
sistent. And prices are relative exchange rates of commodities. 
The other fundamental concept is preferences (or utility functions). Even com-
modities can almost be characterized in terms of them. Karl Marx, for example, 
said, "A commodity [Ware in German] is, in the first place, an object outside us, 
a thing that by its properties satisfies human wants of some sort or other" ( 1967, 
35). Marx did not have a GET, but we might try to adapt his idea. If we take 
preferences as the most fundamental concept and then say that commodities are 
those things over which consumers have preferences, we can continue with the 
above explication of all the other key concepts in terms of commodity. 
It would be very interesting to establish a complete hierarchy of fundamental-
ity for economic concepts, but the main argument of this essay does not require 
it. I do, however, want to concentrate attention on commodity and preference and 
leave aside the others, which are all arguably less fundamental than these two. 
I think it is plausible to take commodity as fundamental in the description of eco-
nomic phenomena. What we observe and wish to explain are exchanges of com-
modities and the properties of these exchanges. Preferences, then, are fundamen-
tal in the explanation of the phenomena. We understand the commodity 
exchanges as having the properties they do primarily because of facts about 
preferences. 
First, however, a potential objection needs to be considered. It is sometimes 
claimed that economics is primarily about relative price levels and the fact that 
equilibrium exists, instead of about facts about consumers. But relative price 
levels are nothing more than the rates at which commodities exchange; prices are 
properties of what is really basic, commodities. The fact of equilibrium (if it is 
indeed a fact) is also, at root, a fact about preferences and commodities. 
Equilibrium obtains when all relative prices are constant and all agents are max-
imizing their utility given that price level and their endowments. 
This encapsulation of the GET framework is, I hope, an aid to understanding 
the structure of the theory, how the parts of the model of actual economic 
phenomena fit together. I now want to proceed to the matter of interpreting the 
model. What does GET tell us about actually observed economic events? It is con-
venient to begin with an analysis of the concept of utility. 
IV 
Theoretically coherent economics that is clearly ancestral to contemporary 
GET can be regarded as beginning around the 1870s, with what is called the 
"Marginalist Revolution." Utility was at this time incorporated into economic the-
ory as a psychological or psychophysical quantity that was measurable in prin-
ciple. It came to be called "cardinal utility" because it was believed that a person's 
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utility level could be assigned a numerical index that was objective in the sense 
that it served for making interpersonal comparisons of utility levels. 9 Economists 
became disaffected with the commitment to cardinal utility in the face of growing 
evidence that most kinds of human behavior are not primarily motivated by cardi-
nal utility maximization and that there probably is no such psychophysical quan-
tity in the first place. 10 It was, however, not possible for this disaffection to take 
root because there was no competing theory with as much potential for explana-
tion and for guiding economic political policy as the utility theory. 
This changed around the beginning of the 1930s with the speedy development 
of a well-developed and mathematically consistent theory based on "ordinal" in-
stead of"cardinal" utility. J. Hicks and R. Allen, in their seminal paper (1934), 
showed how demand functions for individuals, theoretically and empirically im-
portant functions from prices of commodities to the quantities of that commodity 
exchanged for, could be derived from something less than psychophysically 
based rankings of available commodities. All that is mathematically required is 
utility functions that preserve only the consumer's ordering of options and not the 
"cardinality" or magnitudes of the utility differences between options. 11 In other 
words, ordinal utility functions come in classes that are equivalent up to linear 
transformation. Therefore, they demonstrated that cardinal utility functions con-
tain more information than is needed to derive demand curves from first prin-
ciples about individual economic agents. (The derivation of demand curves was, 
and still is, considered very important because some of our best economic data 
is for market demand curves.) 
It was natural to hope that the excess content in cardinal utility functions was 
exactly the part of the theory that was in conflict with the psychological facts that 
had been emerging. In 1938, P. Samuelson showed how this hope could be real-
ized and, in a way, exceeded. He mathematically derived the most characteristic 
and important results of consumer theory from a formalism that did not require 
the postulation of even ordinal utility functions. Instead of deriving the properties 
of individual demand curves from ordinal utility functions and budget constraints, 
points on the demand curves were taken as given. Samuelson was then able to 
prove that these two hypotheses are equivalent: 
i) The commodity bundles chosen by the consumer (i.e., the points on the 
demand curve) conform to the results of maximizing a well-behaved ordi-
nal utility function. 
ii) Points on a demand curve that satisfy the Strong Axiom of Revealed 
Preference (SARP) fully characterize a well-behaved preference map. 12 
The interpretive significance of Samuelson's formalism is considerable. Since 
SARP is a constraint on the choices that consumers make and not on their utility 
functions, the new formalism suggested13 that the old interpretation, the one in 
which the theoretical concept of utility (or preference) plays a role in explaining 
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how economic behavior is partly caused by psychological facts about consumers, 
be abandoned. In short, it suggested that economists instead use overtly observ-
able choices and SARP to construct utility functions when they might prove con-
venient as instruments for prediction. The machinery of consumer theory was 
thereby almost completely severed from the psychological thinking that had be-
gotten it. It was easy to see this as emancipating economics from constraints im-
posed by another science whose relevance to purely economic concerns was no 
longer entirely clear. 14 As Samuelson put it, 
The discrediting of utility as a psychological concept robbed it of its only pos-
sible virtue as an explanation of human behavior in other than a circular sense, 
revealing its emptiness as even a construction. . . . The introduction and 
meaning of [any fact about indifference curves] 15 independent of any psycho-
logical, introspective implications would be, to say the least, ambiguous, and 
would seem an artificial convention in the explanation of price be-
havior .... I propose, therefore that we start anew in direct attack upon the 
problem, dropping off the last vestiges of the utility analysis. This does not 
preclude the introduction ofutility by any who may care to do so . . . (1938a, 
61-62) 
This provides a partial characterization of an interpretation of consumer theory 
based on the Revealed Preference formalism. I shall call it the "Utility-as-
Revealed interpretation." 
Utility-as-Revealed Interpretation 
Consumers' psychological states are not part of the economic explanation of 
their behavior. Any reference to concepts such as utility and preference is for 
the sake of convenience and is fully eliminable from the theory. 
Something like this is often called the "Revealed Preference Interpretation." It is 
good to avoid this name because Revealed Preference is not an interpretation or 
even a theory- it is an axiomatic formalization of a part of consumer theory. 
According to this interpretation, we are not to think of observed choices as re-
vealing what the preferences are at all. If a consumer makes choices that are con-
sistent with SARP, then he acts as if he were maximizing utility or getting onto 
the highest indifference curve, but there is no ontological commitment to these 
mentalistic things. And since the theory is not ontologically committed to them, 
then any facts that other scientists (e.g., psychologists) discover about them can 
safely be ignored. 16 
So the revealed preference interpretation provides a rationale for disregarding 
the severe problems that empirical psychologists were discovering in cardinal 
utility theory. The ordinal utility theory, however, does not require the revealed 
preference interpretation. 
There is a second important interpretation in which preferences (represented 
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by ordinal utility functions) are understood to occupy a much more important po-
sition in the theory. They are regarded as providing part of a causal explanation 
of why economic agents behave as they do, instead of simply describing their be-
havior; I shall call it the "Utility-as-Explanatory Interpretation." 
Utility-as-Explanatory Interpretation 
Consumer theory explains economic behavior as well as describing and 
predicting it. The explanation comes from a causal story: a) An agent is con-
fronted with a choice set of commodity bundles that is partly determined by 
his endowment and income and partly by availability; b) he compares this 
choice set to his indifference map; and c) he chooses the bundle that lies on 
the highest indifference curve. 
Thus, indifference maps are taken to be a partial cause of the observed behavior, 
qua economic behavior. Alternatively, since well-behaved preference maps are 
fully represented by ordinal utility functions, we might substitute for b) and c): 
b') He plugs this information into his utility function, and c') chooses the bundle 
that is calculated to give the greatest utility. Hence, the name. It is quite certain 
that little of the "comparing" or "calculating" referred to is done consciously, but 
that is to be expected. Many complicated psychological tasks involve substantial 
amounts of cognition that does not take place at the conscious level. The under-
standing and production oflanguage is an example. In what follows, I shall argue 
that the Utility-as-Explanatory interpretation is superior to Utility-as-Revealed. 
The crucial differences between Utility-as-Revealed and Utility-as-
Explanatory can be brought out by familiar episodes from the history of other 
sciences in which analogous distinctions have been important. Consider the 
mathematical expression for the Balmer series of the hydrogen atom. Before 
scientists discovered how to derive this expression from the Bohr model of the 
atom, it appeared to be a fortuitous piece of numerology concocted to conform 
to existing data. The fact that it gave excellent empirical results and was eventu-
ally shown to predict even the frequencies of previously unobserved spectral lines 
contributed to scientists' confidence in the relationship, but Balmer's formula did 
not explain the phenomena that it described. In this case, an explanation of the 
frequencies required some account of what causes the lines to come out the way 
that they do. The explanation was provided only after the appearance of spectral 
lines was understood as resulting from differences in the energies of various exci-
tation states of the atom's electrons. 
According to Utility-as-Revealed, utility functions must have the status that 
Balmer's formula had before physicists knew how to derive it from more fun-
damental laws. Utility functions are concocted to fit the available data, and we 
hope that they are able to correctly predict previously unobserved phenomena. 
It is not, according to Utility-as-Revealed, in order to inquire as to why a certain 
utility function accounts for the data. Economists who believe in Utility-as-
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Revealed are not interested in deriving the utility functions from anything more 
fundamental or more general, nor are they interested in trying to understand how 
a utility function might be connected with the causes of the behavior that it 
describes. But according to Utility-as-Explanatory, theoretical economic entities 
like utility functions ought to explain phenomena by providing a story about their 
causation. Accepting Utility-as-Explanatory commits one to attributing a causal 
role to the facts about human economic agents described by utility functions. 
Analogously, we now understand Balmer's formula (or Balmer's law, as it ap-
pears to us now in light of its derivation) to describe causally significant proper-
ties of entities such as atoms, electrons, and photons. 
If a causal role cannot be found for utility functions, then there is some danger 
that they are not like Balmer's law as much as they are like Bode's law. Bode's 
law (which is really not a law at all) was a mathematical expression concocted 
to give the di~tance of the planets, Mercury through Saturn, from the Sun. It 
turned out, like Balmer's law, to be an astonishingly accurate predictor. The mean 
orbital radii of the asteroid belt and Uranus fit Bode's law almost perfectly. Even 
its predictions for Neptune and Pluto were within reason. 17 But Bode's law is ob-
viously only a historical curiosity. Unlike Balmer's law, it is not recognized as 
a law, even though it has never been convincingly disconfirmed. 18 
According to Utility-as-Revealed, economic descriptions of choice behavior 
are more like the description given by Bode's law than the one given by Balmer's 
law. It says that utility functions are supposed to do no more than describe actual 
choices, thus their variables and parameters are specified post facto so that they 
necessarily yield the correct results. There is no presumption about the nature of 
any underlying causal mechanism. It may then be hoped that they are also useful 
for prediction. Many commentators have pointed out that this practice can reduce 
utility functions to tautologies. It is possible to concoct a utility function that can 
give an empty account of almost any behavior. This means, moreover, that if at 
time T we assign utility function Ui to agent i and her behavior at T + t dis-
confirms Ui, it is a similarly trivial matter to modify Ui to account for the new 
behavior as well. The result of this uninteresting process is clearly a mere descrip-
tion and not a scientific theory at all. The situation is directly analogous to, say, 
providing neo-Ptolemaic derivations of all ephemeridical data through today's 
date. With enough circles and epicycles, there is little question that it is possible 
to do this, but no one would care much about the results. Providing Ptolemaic 
derivations today would be little more than an exercise, because the results could 
not afford us with an explanation of any astronomical phenomena. The Ptolemaic 
setup has no chance of being even approximately true, or true ceteris paribus, 
given our current understanding of astronomy. 
The problem with unsatisfactory theories like Ptolemaic positional astronomy 
or Bode's law is not only that they can be manipulated to account very accurately 
for a large number of observations. Reasonable theories like Newtonian 
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mechanics can likewise account for any collection of celestial motions by simply 
postulating sufficient ad hoc forces. Instead, theories like Ptolemy's fail primarily 
because of the severely limited range of phenomena that they can account for; 
Ptolemaic theory and Aristotelian spheres apply only to the motion of the Sun, 
Moon, and six planets, while Newtonian mechanics applies to countless kinds of 
motions. What makes contemporary Ptolemaic theory trivial is the a priori re-
striction on the range of phenomena that have evidential bearing on it. It is not 
possible to use unrelated, well-confirmed theories to get access to any other infor-
mation that could independently confirm the problematic theory. In contrast, the 
Newtonian account of celestial motions can be independently corroborated by ter-
restrial motions. The Newtonian formulas fitted to celestial motions are con-
strained by phenomena other than the ones they are devised to describe. There 
is an analogous difference between Utility-as-Revealed and Utility-as-
Explanatory. In the former there is, by stipulation, no observational or ex-
perimental access to utility functions independent of the instances of behavior that 
they describe. 
In Utility-as-Explanatory, however, the whole point of mentioning utility is 
to give an insightful characterization of how and why the observed behavior 
comes about. Moreover, since the maximization of utility is given a part in a 
causal story, it has real ontological standing. This means that there are, in prin-
ciple, ways of finding out about it aside from observing its effects on overt eco-
nomic exchanging behavior. This is important. Seventeenth-century natural phil-
osophers would have been much more suspicious of universal gravitation if it 
were introduced only as a means of accounting for celestial motions. It was a great 
advantage that the same force postulated to account for those phenomena had al-
ready proven its worth in (what seemed to be) an entirely different domain-
terrestrial motions. In another article (Nelson 1986), there is a fairly detailed 
treatment of how this might work in economics. I can only briefly summarize the 
results here. 
The Utility-as-Explanatory interpretation eventually requires experimental in-
vestigation of individual economic behavior. One basic, but powerful considera-
tion in favor of this position is that once preferences are assigned a causal role, 
they must be treated as things or entities in the strongest sense. And when one 
is scientifically investigating things, one does not deliberately ignore any avail-
able information about these things without compelling reasons to do so. An ex-
cellent source of information about individuals' preferences, perhaps the best 
source, is the actual economic behavior of the individual in question. Attending 
primarily to individuals does not have the terrible result that interesting generali-
zations cannot be made across individuals. Economics would not be of much in-
terest if it produced a separate theory for every agent in an economy. Even if con-
sumers differ in their relative appreciation of avocados and bananas, however, 
their utility functions may be represented by similar mathematical forms. One 
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consumer's preferences might, for example, be of the form (3 x number of 
avocados+ 2 x number of bananas) while another's might be of the form (num-
ber of avocados + 5 x number of bananas), but both of these consumers have 
utilities that are linear in avocados and bananas. What needs to be done to deter-
mine what particular individuals' utility functions look like is some experimental 
investigation in either the laboratory or the marketplace. 19 
v 
So far, the argument for preferring Utility-as-Explanatory to Utility-as-
Revealed has relied on considerations familiar to philosophers of science. While 
these are, I think, quite convincing in their own right, it is initially worrisome 
that many, perhaps most, economists who have considered the matter say that 
they prefer Utility-as-Revealed. If there were reasons deeply rooted in the neces-
sities of economic practice for their stated preference, we would have a very per-
plexing problem about the foundations of economics. Therefore, let us continue 
by examining not what economists say about how the theory should be inter-
preted, but instead the interpretation that emerges from their own discussions of 
economic, and not philosophical problems. 
In a very revealing passage in an important textbook, J. Henderson and R. 
Quandt write, 
At the beginning of this chapter, the cardinal approach to utility theory was 
rejected on the grounds that there is no reason to assume that the consumer 
possesses a cardinal measure of utility. By the same token one could question 
whether she even possesses an indifference map. It can fortunately be proved 
that a consumer who always conforms to the axioms of revealed preference 
must possess an indifference map. . . . If the consumer does not conform to 
the axioms, she is said to be "irrational". Her inconsistent actions mean that 
she does not possess an indifference map, and the shape of her utility function 
cannot be determined by observing her behavior. (1980, 46, emphasis added) 
Is this the correct way to handle inconsistent actions (e.g., actions that seem to 
reflect intransitive preferences) according to Utility-as-Revealed? It seems 
strange to say that in these circumstances the consumer "does not possess an in-
difference map"; Utility-as-Revealed says that descriptions of the indifference 
maps are constructed by simply recording the choices that the consumer would 
make in given circumstances (or, according to Revealed Preference, recording 
the actual choices and smoothly interpolating the missing points on the map). This 
can be done no matter what the choices turn out to be. The strangeness can be 
resolved by remembering that 'indifference map' is shorthand for 'indifference 
map conforming to some basic assumptions'. Thus, in standard economic usage, 
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what constitutes an indifference map cannot be just any batch of points in com-
modity space. 
So we are supposed to say that the irrationally behaving consumer does not 
possess an indifference map. This is in accord with the teaching of the Revealed 
Preference Interpretation. But Henderson and Quandt go on to conclude that, "the 
shape of her utility function cannot be determined by observing her behavior." 
That clearly implies that a utility function does exist and that it does conform to 
the standard restrictive assumptions, but in this case the consumer does not "pay 
attention" to it while making some economic choices. This implication is inconsis-
tent with Utility-as-Revealed. It is a mathematical fact (and true on any interpreta-
tion of the theory) that ordinal utility functions are equivalent to well-behaved in-
difference maps. Therefore, if we are going to say that the errant consumer 
possesses no indifference maps, then we must also say that she possesses no utility 
function. The only alternative is to maintain that she does have a utility function 
or the equivalent indifference map, but (sometimes) does not pay attention to it, 
or does not use it, when choosing. But Utility-as-Revealed says that indifference 
maps must be understood as being mere constructs of choices. The internal incon-
sistency is unavoidable. 
I think that this confusion finds its way into the quoted passage because Utility-
as-Explanatory is so reasonable that one must be extremely vigilant if one wishes 
to avoid believing it at all costs. A very neat account of the errant consumer's be-
havior has already been hinted at. She has a utility function. How is it then that 
she goes astray while making an economic choice? It is because something has 
interfered with her accurately maximizing her utility function. Perhaps her 
knowledge of the choice that she was making was deficient, or perhaps she was 
nervous or short of time so that she made an error, or perhaps the choice was so 
complicated that it was beyond her mathematical abilities to make the maximizing 
choice, and so forth. Ifwe are to come up with economic explanations, it is proba-
bly wise to avoid trying to account for every conceivable type of interference with 
purely economic phenomena. 
This is probably what Henderson and Quandt meant, but if one is committed 
to Utility-as-Revealed, it is quite difficult to say what one means. If a utility func-
tion is merely a description of an agent's behavior, and we do not want to count 
behavior that has been interfered with in ways that obscure the economically rele-
vant features of the behavior, then how can the function be characterized? We 
must say something like this: a utility function describes the choices an agent 
would make if the choices that were to be made were not interfered with in certain 
ways. The counterfactuals in this characterization must evidently be cashed out 
psychologically, but Utility-as-Revealed proposes to ignore this resource. So we 
are returned to the fact that Utility-as-Revealed precludes actually obtaining an 
indifference map for an actual individual economic agent. That task would in-
volve either dabbling in psychology or employing aggregate data. 20 
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Another context in which economists seem to be committed to Utility-as-
Explanatory in spite of themselves is in discussions of what commodities ought 
to appear as the independent variables (or "arguments") of utility functions. This 
is illustrated by microeconomic treatments of money (and some macroeconomic 
treatments of wealth that have microfoundations in GET). It is overwhelmingly 
obvious that one thing actual economic agents enjoy getting their hands on is 
money. This is true even when the stuff that serves as money in a particular econ-
omy has no other important practical use. Rational agents are just as anxious to 
acquire bits of paper printed by governments or banks whose only value lies in 
that fact that they are, for whatever reasons, considered to be money. They will 
prefer a ten-dollar bill to nine dollars' worth of gold, even though the gold can 
be useful and valuable for purposes other than exchange. This kind of intrinsically 
useless money is called "fiat money." 
The point emerges when we consider a revealed preference experiment. A ra-
tional agent is asked to choose between a bucket of dollar bills and an avocado. 
She is then asked to choose between a dime and a bucket of avocados, and so forth 
for a very large number of combinations of avocados and U.S. currency. After 
completing the experiment, it is an easy matter to construct an indifference map 
for this agent between avocados and fiat money, and therefore partially to con-
struct an ordinal utility function that includes avocados and fiat money as depen-
dent variables. It is significant that economists are extremely reluctant to do this. 
Neil Wallace writes, 
The principal way of abandoning intrinsic uselessness [the thesis that fiat 
money is never wanted for its own sake] is to make money an argument of util-
ity functions or engineering production functions. But this begs too many 
questions. Is it fiat money or commodity money that appears in these func-
tions? What if there are several fiat moneys, those of different countries? Do 
all appear, and if so, how? Does Robinson Crusoe have fiat money as an argu-
ment of his utility function? And what about other pieces of paper? . . . All 
of this is to say that theories that abandon intrinsic uselessness will be almost 
devoid of implications. (1980, 49) 
James Tobin is more blunt, 
Clearly enough, the value of paper money does not derive from the beauty of 
the engravings; the practice of putting money stocks in utility functions is 
reprehensible. (1980, 86) 
Why is it "reprehensible" to include certain dependent variables in utility func-
tions if the functions that result are the best at saving the phenomena? Why does 
including some extra dependent variables render a utility function "devoid of im-
plications"? It is especially surprising to see a greatly respected economist wor-
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ried about begging empirical questions. Is it fiat money or commodity money? 
Why not obtain the answer by repeating the revealed preference experiment I sug-
gested, substituting a commodity money for avocados? Is it U.S. money or U.K. 
money? Why not find out by offering combinations of buckets of each variety? 
Which, if any, does Robinson Crusoe have in his utility function? If we can find 
him, we can experiment on him. These utility functions are empirically very rich 
and not at all "almost devoid of implications." 
I conclude that the powerful sentiments against including money in utility 
functions stem from the idea that utility is a measure of something real. Perhaps 
it is not very plain what the "something" is supposed to be, whether it is a measure 
of psychic satisfaction, or literally something that has utility as a property, or 
something else. Anyway it appears that according to these and many other ex-
tremely influential economists, a piece of paper cannot give one this something 
(except in small quantities when it is used as wallpaper or to light a cigarette); 
fiat money can only be exchanged for another commodity, another real com-
modity, that does confer the mysterious something on a agent. But any theoretical 
entity that is separable in this way from the observation of actual choices of eco-
nomic agents cannot be given a meaningful interpretation by Utility-as-Revealed. 
If utility is going to be considered an objective psychological construct with 
causal efficacy, then any economic theory that is going to be a theory of this con-
struct requires an interpretation something like Utility-as-Explanatory. There-
fore, the popular view of money expressed in the above quotations is committed 
to a denial of Utility-as-Revealed. 21 
A third example of the discomfiture that can be caused by adherence to Utility-
as-Revealed is provided by Milton Friedman's analysis of demand (1976). He 
writes, 
. . . [we] shall suppose that the individual in making these decisions acts as if 
he were pursuing and attempting to maximize a single end. This implies that dif-
ferent goods have some common characteristic that makes comparisons among 
them possible. This common characteristic is usually called utility . ... We 
observe that people choose; if this is to be regarded as a deliberative act, it must 
be supposed that the various things among which choice is made can be com-
pared; to be compared, they must have something in common. 
Let X, Y, Z, etc., stand for the quantities of various commodities. Then 
the notion that these commodities have some element in common and that the 
magnitude of this common element, utility, depends on the amounts of the var-
ious commodities can be expressed by writing utility as a function of X, Y, 
Z .... (35-36) 
The most striking thing about this treatment is that it makes utility a property of 
the commodities themselves. It is more common to treat utility as a representation 
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or index of the consumer's preferences. The commoner treatment, then, makes 
the amount of utility associated with any commodity object essentially relative to 
the consumer who consumes it. Each consumer has his own, perhaps unique, util-
ity function that determines how much utility he "gets" from a given bundle of 
commodities. But according to Friedman, the total amount of utility from a com-
modity bundle is obtained by combining the amounts of utility inherent in each 
commodity in the bundle. Facts about the consumer, therefore, are irrelevant to 
determining the utility level. 
Friedman's motivation for this nonstandard approach is clear. The already 
sparse ontological requirements of Utility-as-Revealed appear to have been fur-
ther purified. Utility-as-Revealed allows a specially defined property ofutility to 
be attributed to individual consumers, or at least to an idealized average in-
dividual. Friedman does not allow even this hint of economic cognition on the 
part of consumers; utility is a completely objective property of physical objects. 
Consumers use information about this utility to make otherwise inscrutable 
deliberations resulting in observable choice. 
The proposal is difficult to interpret. It apparently entails that there is only one 
utility function, because utility is a "common element" in commodities, and a util-
ity function simply gives the total magnitude of the common element that results 
from combining commodities (and hence, utility) in bundles. If follows that con-
sumers' deliberations are all based on the same central economic fact- the amount 
of utility in the bundles under consideration. This means that if two consumers 
are weighing the choice between a bowl of beans and a bowl of rice, the only eco-
nomically relevant difference in their deliberations will be their incomes. So if 
they have identical incomes, any difference in observed choice must result from 
economically inscrutable aspects of their deliberations. To most economists, this 
result will seem daft. If one consumer chooses the beans and the other the rice, 
microeconomics ought to say that the first prefers rice to beans, and the second 
prefers beans to rice. Or, equivalently, one gets more utility from rice than from 
beans, and the other more utility from beans than from rice. According to Fried-
man, microeconomics must say that one deliberated differently from the other, 
and the whole explanation of this must be found in another science, like psy-
chology. 
Another way of expressing this position is to say that, from an economic point 
of view, consumers are identical up to their budget constraints. Instead of iden-
tifying consumers by their utility functions, all economically explainable be-
havioral differences are to be attributed to diverse budget constraints resulting 
from differences in incomes or prices. This consequence of Friedman's view has 
seemed attractive to a few other notable economists (though for different rea-
sons), but it has some grave flaws. Perhaps the worst of these is that it is easy 
to construct counterfactual economic situations that ought to be explainable by 
any account, but are not by this one. Consider again the two consumers with iden-
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tical incomes who, when faced with the same choice between a bowl of beans and 
a bowl of rice, make different choices. There is a natural and satisfying explana-
tion of this phenomenon in the Utility-as-Explanatory interpretation of microeco-
nomics, and there may be at least a pretense of explanation in Utility-as-
Revealed. The Utility-as-Element-of-Commodity interpretation however, like 
the hapless anti-Copernican who denied the responsibility of explaining planetary 
phases, arbitrarily and unnecessarily restricts the scope of the theory. Since there 
are no mitigating circumstances, the rejection of the interpretation is indicated. 
Both an investigation of economist's actual practice and independent methodo-
logical considerations lead us to the conclusion that the best interpretation of util-
ity theory requires us to think of concepts such as utility as robustly real. The real-
ity of these concepts does not derive its significance by extending economic 
theory to additional results about economic markets; the theory's usefulness for 
dealing with markets is unaffected by (sensible) methodological interpretation. 
The Utility-as-Explanatory interpretation does have some important empirical 
implications for psychology (utility is to be psychologically real; see Nelson, 
1986) and also for the economic behavior of individuals. In the next section, I 
shall argue that there are further implications of considerable philosophical in-
terest. One might, however, object at this point that these conclusions are too 
strong. From an examination of economic theorizing and some basic lessons from 
the history of science, I seem to have concluded that some kind of scientific real-
ism is true, and instrumentalism and other anti-realisms are false. Surely such a 
conclusion would require more purely philosophical reasoning. 
But my conclusions do not involve any controversial philosophical doctrines 
about realism and instrumentalism. I have argued that Utility-as-Explanatory 
opens the possibility that important facts about utility functions can be inferred 
from observations of individual economic behavior and, perhaps, even from 
some kinds of noneconomic behavior of interest to psychologists. There is no sen-
sible scientific instrumentalism of the general sort that is inconsistent with this. 
Sophisticated instrumentalists say that we have no warrant to regard unobservable 
theoretical constructs as ordinary entities. 22 This is a purely philosophical stance 
to adopt towards a scientific theory; it does not have any implications for how the 
science is to be conducted. In particular, it obviously does not proscribe any 
means of investigating the properties of the theoretical constructs. Proper scien-
tific method, according to the sophisticated instrumentalist, requires us to behave 
as if the objects apparently referred to by the theory exist. It may even be psycho-
logically helpful for the scientist to actively pretend that they exist. 
But this is all that is required by the arguments I have given for Utility-as-
Explanatory. This interpretation does not require any particular philosophical 
stance on the precise ontological standing of theoretical constructs that are, in 
some sense, unobservable. So, for example, if we are to pretend that utility func-
tions exist, the pretense commits us to recognizing the potential relevance and im-
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portance of experiments done in psychology laboratories that (pretend to) inves-
tigate them. Neither Utility-as-Explanatory nor sophisticated instrumentalism 
permits us to ignore psychological effects of utility functions on the grounds that 
they do not really exist. Similarly, an instrumentalist does not argue against the 
construction and use of electron microscopes on the grounds that electrons do not 
really exist. It is enough that electrons seem to exist. Thus, the argument of this 
paper has no direct bearing on realism/anti-realism issues. In what follows, I shall 
take this for granted and speak of utility functions, commodities, and the like as 
"existing." 
VI 
I have argued at some length for the Utility-as-Explanatory interpretation. 
This interpretation reinforces the plausible idea that the concepts of utility and 
preference as they appear in GET are more than convenient fictions. They seem 
instead to.be closely related to corresponding putative natural kinds in the world. 
This has important implications for our initial problem about the degree of empir-
ical success of economic theory. I have already described how Utility-as-
Explanatory places potential empirical constraints on economics, constraints that 
come from psychology, neurology, or some other science. 
One obvious explanation of the empirical difficulties of economics would be 
that it is a false theory precisely because these constraints are not met. It may be 
that experimental studies of the psychology of economic behavior, or of neurol-
ogy, etc., will show that nothing that can be sensibly represented by preferences 
or maximizing goes on when humans behave economically. It is very unfortunate 
that very little of this kind of experimental study of economic behavior is being 
done. We are beginning to see a good deal of data on overt economic behavior 
under laboratory conditions (there is the kind of work initiated by Vernon Smith 
and his associates, see e.g., Smith 1982) and some data on animals like pigeons 
and rats. We will need to wait quite a long time before we have enough results 
from investigations of the right kinds of "nonovert," "internal" economic 
phenomena to be able to see whether economics actually meets the relevant con-
straints (again, see Nelson 1986 for more discussion). 
If I am right, then interpreters of economics are faced with a dilemma. They 
must either adopt the mistaken Utility-as-Revealed interpretation or sit and wait 
for the verdict of currently unpracticed experimental procedure. In what follows, 
I shall be examining a potential way out of this dilemma. Those who fear that eco-
nomics might be unfairly convicted by constraints imposed by arguments con-
cerning a difficult theoretical notion such as utility will welcome the possibility 
of this way out. 
The position is developed by shifting our focus from the concepts ofutility and 
preference back to the other central concept, the commodity. Because of the close 
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connection between utility and commodity, the adoption of Utility-as-Explanatory 
yields a parallel interpretation of commodity. Commodities, like utility functions, 
are more than a picturesque aid to describing actual choices. They are the things 
that real agents choose to exchange and produce; hence, in GET they are an essen-
tial part of the explanation of economic behavior. This follows from Utility-as-
Explanatory and the fact that utility functions can be defined as mappings from 
qu.antities of commodities to levels of utility. 
The case for a robust interpretation of commodities may be even stronger than 
the case for so interpreting utility. Utility is an indispensible link in the explana-
tory chain, and there is potentially a variety of means by which its effects might 
be observed. Still, we never directly observe a utility function; we infer their exis-
tence from direct observations of their various effects. Commodities seem differ-
ent in this respect. Although the theoretical notion of a commodity is central to 
the very abstract GET, we are inclined to think that modern people have a clear 
pretheoretical notion of what a commodity is. Utility functions, in contrast, 
would probably not occur to a layperson trying to grapple with interesting eco-
nomic phenomena-a "folk economist." Some things that turn out to count as 
commodities in the theory are admittedly somewhat surprising: shares of stock 
in financial institutions and currency futures, for example. But the paradigm cases 
of actual commodities are such familiar items as avocados, shoes, and theater 
tickets. Even sophisticated treatments take it for granted that GET's commodities 
are to be closely related to, or even identified with, what we pretheoretically think 
of as commodities:23 "A general equilibrium theory is a theory about both the 
quantities and the prices of all commodities" (Arrow and Hahn 1971, 2, emphasis 
added). Most economists, if asked to describe what phenomena they are theoriz-
ing about, would reply with facts about ordinary objects and their aggregates. The 
price of bananas at the supermarket, the output of the auto industry, the wages 
of steelworkers, and the glut of avocados. These seem to be the natural economic 
kinds that we want to have a theory of; we do not need a theory to tell us what 
they are. Similarly, it is good to have a theoretical understanding of water, but 
we are inclined to think that we know much about water before we learn any 
science. We want to say it is manifestly a natural kind. 
So it seems extremely plausible to think that the central concepts of economics, 
the natural-kind terms of the theory, do pick out natural economic kinds in the 
world. And, one might think, we do not need to worry about the interpretive 
dilemma posed by the analysis of utility. Even if we became convinced that GET 
and related theories were simply bad and ought to be rejected, it would be plau-
sible to think that we had bad theories of the kinds of things these theories are 
about. We would seek better theories of the same things: the purchases of con-
sumers, fluctuations in banana prices, the relative wage rates of Wall Street 
analysts and professors, and so on. These are the kinds of things that are salient 
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in our economic life, and we want a scientific theory to make events involving 
them explainable, predictable, and intelligible. 
Here we can draw an interesting analogy with the philosophy of psychology. 
Many think that there is something called folk psychology, an informal theory that 
we all learn without formal study. 24 This theory, or prototheory, is relied upon 
in our everyday lives to explain intentional behavior as resulting from our acting 
on our beliefs to fulfill our desires. Folk psychology may be further articulated 
to deal with other kinds of mental states like worries, suspicions, imaginings, and 
rememberings. Some philosophers say that folk psychology is almost useless to 
the modern scientific psychologist. They think that, as a matter of empirical fact, 
the vocabulary of folk psychology as it is presently understood does not refer to 
natural kinds. They expect that the advance of cognitive psychology and neuro-
science will force us to either eliminate concepts like belief and desire from a true 
scientific theory of behavior, or to heavily revise our folk-theoretic understanding 
of them. There is, however, a second view of the status of folk psychology. The 
proponents of the second view argue that pretheoretic concepts like belief are not 
subject to revision by science. If some scientific theory tells us that there is no 
such thing as beliefs, then this is ipso facto not a theory about intentional be-
havior. It might be a fine theory for what it is about, but it would be quite irrele-
vant to a range of phenomena we cannot help but regard as centrally important. 
Similarly, if some biological theory were to tell us there is nothing scientific to 
be said about human beings because the important generalizations are over some 
other kinds, then we would stubbornly look for another theory to tell us what we 
want to know about humans-humans are inescapably interesting. 
If this second view is correct, then there are some domains for which we know 
what some of the natural kinds are before we do any real science. Before we do 
any psychology, for example, we are supposed to know what we want psychology 
to do for us: explain how our beliefs interact with our desires to contribute to the 
production of our behavior. Of course, the second view is not correct for all 
sciences. People used to mistakenly think that Earth was essentially different from 
other planets. A science whose development was constrained by the necessity of 
respecting pretheoretical beliefs about the Earth would not have turned out (did 
not turn out) very well. 25 It might be true, nevertheless, that we are not always 
prepared to let science have the first cuts when we carve up the world into intel-
ligible slices. 
Perhaps an analogue of this second view about folk-psychological concepts is 
appropriate for economic concepts as well. Commodities, preferences for com-
modities, prices of commodities, and so forth, may be so deeply ingrained in our 
pretheoretical thinking about economic life, in our folk economics, that we shall 
insist that a fully adequate scientific theory of economic phenomena be about 
them. Another theory that dealt with some aspects of economic life, but did not 
employ these concepts simply wouldn't be economics. If this is right, then it is 
ARE ECONOMIC KINDS NATURAL? 121 
no surprise that a highly coherent theory employing exactly these concepts should 
have developed. Perhaps I need not have produced a long argument to establish 
what the natural economic kinds are; instead, the argument might be viewed as 
a checkup on the health of the theory. Had the theory been built around other con-
cepts, it would be unhealthy economics. Is this optimistic, conservative outlook 
justified? 
To answer this question it is helpful to begin by reconsidering the nonconser-
vative view of the scientific viability of folk psychology. On what ground might 
nonconservativism be justified? The most obvious would be the clear prospect of 
a successful empirical theory of human behavior that made no use of folk-
psychological terms as they are ordinarily conceived. But psychologists have not 
yet found anything like this; the best we have are some arguments that research 
programs that are not committed to folk-psychological concepts are more promis-
ing. Another convincing though less powerful ground for nonconservativism 
would be a demonstration that scientific psychology based on folk concepts was 
quite hopelessly stagnant. In this case, we might abandon conservative psychol-
ogy even in the absence of a competitor; we might search for a replacement in 
vacuo or even conclude that scientific psychology is impossible. Again, as a mat-
ter of empirical fact, this ground does not obtain. 
Do either of these considerations, that is, the prospect of a better nonconserva-
tive theory or a demonstration of conservative stagnation, come to bear in the case 
of economics? We might be persuaded that there are serious competitors to eco-
nomics in the image of GET, but relatively few economists will claim that we are 
in possession of a better theory. There is, however, some consensus that GET 
is in some danger of stagnation. Whether the theory itself is stagnating is con-
troversial. The theory is constantly being beautifully articulated, but some would 
argue that the details of existing theory are being highly polished without any fun-
damental advances taking place. But it is uncontroversial that our ability to apply 
the theory to predict, control, or even explain actual phenomena is stagnating. 
As noted at the start of this essay, many prominent economists have argued that 
economics is almost a paradigm case of a stagnating science. 
The question whether we should revise or abandon our folk-psychological 
concepts will not have much urgency until we see some decisive empirical de-
velopments. But in economics, the argument from stagnation is strong enough - I 
shall assume this in this essay-to make us take seriously the possibility that the 
root of the problem with GET-based economics is its conservative nature. The 
argument from stagnation is apparently reinforced by some examples of progress 
in the physical sciences. In physical science, the starting point for the develop-
ment of a theory is often a pretheoretical notion-a part of folk science. For ex-
ample, the untutored human intellect tends to see mechanical phenomena in a 
rather Aristotelian impetus framework. Bodies suffering impacts gain something, 
impetus, that propels them into motion and sustains motion until it is depleted. 26 
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Other examples: it used to be thought that the Earth was uniquely distinguished 
from the celestial bodies and that it, therefore, was governed by a wholly different 
set of physical principles. Also, it was very widely thought that the heart was the 
center of most bodily functions and of life itself, and that electricity was a kind 
of fluid-it is easy to go on. 
In each of these cases, beginning with scientific concepts picked out by terms 
in the vernacular, that is with folk-scientific concepts, led to empirically bad 
scientific theory. One might even think that it is partly characteristic of scientific 
inquiry (as opposed to other ways of finding out about the world) that our inher-
ently uninformed folk concepts be rejected in favor of those that allow us to in-
crease the precision and intelligibility of our predictions and explanations. In light 
of the considerations raised by historical cases, we might judge it an error to fixate 
on folk concepts when doing science. 
Could this be the root of the persistent empirical difficulties facing economics? 
Is it the case that economics has uncritically taken folk notions and built a vast 
theoretical edifice upon such unsubstantial foundations? If commodity is inescapa-
bly a vernacular kind, a folk concept, and hence not a natural kind, and if, more-
over, we require that economics be about actual commodities, then the beginning 
of an apparent explanation of the theory's shortcomings presents itself. 
It can be shown, however, that this is not a good explanation. There is, I shall 
argue, at least one imposing example of a very successful scientific theory that 
was founded on a folk concept. I have in mind Newtonian mechanics-the theory 
as it appears in Newton's Principia and not later elaborations and improvements 
of the theory. Just as modern economics is founded on the commodity, Newtonian 
mechanics is founded on the body. 
I first need to produce some evidence for this idea. There appear to be competi-
tors for the status of foundational concept in Newtonian mechanics, or it appears, 
at least, that there is no single central-kind term. There are motions (and this even 
seems to be a folk concept), both uniform and accelerated; there are forces; and 
there are interactions. I shall first argue that the concept of body is the folk con-
cept. I shall then show how the other important kinds in the theory are derivative 
in the same way that important economic kinds can be derived from commodity. 
The word body (corporis in Latin)27 first appears in the Principia in Newton's 
own preface to the first edition. There he says, "But since the manual arts are 
chiefly employed in the moving of bodies, it happens that geometry is commonly 
referred to their magnitude, and mechanics to their motion" (C xvii, emphasis 
added). Manual arts, of course, deal with what we prescientifically take to be bod-
ies, or "physical objects." So mechanics is to be about the motions of ordinary 
bodies. But after reading this prefatory remark, one might still wonder whether 
the theory deals with these motions in virtue of dealing with some idealized kind 
of body that only resembles or represents actual, ordinary bodies. Such is not the 
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case. The famous first law of motion says, "Every body continues in its state of 
rest . . . ", and the elucidation goes on to say: 
Projectiles continue in their motions, so far as they are not retarded by the re-
sistance of air. . . . A top . . . does not cease its rotation, otherwise than 
it is retarded by the air. The greater bodies of the planets and comets . . . 
preserve their motions both progressive and circular for a much longer time. 
(C 13) 
There is clearly nothing of an ideal or representational character about "projec-
tiles retarded by air," "tops retarded by air," and "planets and comets." All of these 
bodies are precisely the kinds of things we are familiar with before any investiga-
tions in the science of mechanics (though recognizing the celestial bodies as bod-
ies takes some science). 
Futhermore, there is never any analysis of body in the Principia to suggest that 
in the theory the concept has some complexity not present in the common con-
cept. When, in the Scholium to the Definitions (C 6-12), we are given clarifying 
definitions of some fundamental terms that are "well known to all" such as 'time', 
'space', and 'motion', the term 'body' is conspicuously absent. We do learn that 
there are "particles of bodies" (C xviii) that compose them, but since at least some 
particles are themselves divisible and not essentially atomic, and since some bod-
ies are so small as to be insensible (C 399), it seems that the things Newton calls 
particles are themselves bodies. So bodies are made up of smaller bodies, quite 
in keeping with the common, pretheoretical concept. 
Finally, most other apparently fundamental and apparently theoretical terms 
are straightforwardly definable in terms of body. Motion, both relative and abso-
lute, is simply "the translation of a body from one absolute/relative place to an-
other" (C 7). Place is "part of a space which a body takes up" (C 6). All that re-
main are space, time, and forces. These, like body, are unanalyzable, though 
Newton's space and time are probably not pretheoretical concepts, and forces cer-
tainly are not. But unlike space and time, forces, both inertial and impressed, can-
not be understood apart from bodies. "The innate force of matter [subsequently 
called vis inertiae or inertia] is a power of resisting by which every body ... 
continues in its present state .... "and "An impressed force is an action ex-
erted upon a body .... "(C 2). So inertial forces are essentially connected to 
bodies, and impressed forces are necessarily forces on bodies. Moreover, any 
force impressed on a body somehow originates with some other body or bodies; 
consider gravitational force, magnetic force, tensions, etc. Similarly, a body's in-
ertial force will not be exerted unless there is a force impressed on it. Therefore, 
a perfectly isolated body would neither exert nor feel any forces, so forces do not 
exist except in the presence of more than one body. Moreover, once we have bod-
ies and the forces that act on them, we have everything. Newton says the whole 
burden of philosophy is, " . . . from the phenomena of motions to investigate 
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the forces of nature, and then from these forces to demonstrate the other 
phenomena ... " (C xvii-xviii). 
Thus the only things that are, in a sense, ontologically independent in Newto-
nian mechanics are space, time, and body. But Newton did not think that his the-
ory was in any way about space and time (though today we may be inclined to 
disagree with him about this). It is about bodies in space and time. It did not seem 
strange to Newton to accord space and time this peculiar status; for him they are 
charged with theological significance (C 545). I conclude that the whole of New-
tonian mechanics, as it is expressed in the Principia, rests on the concept of body; 
bodies are the kinds of things that the theory is about. And these bodies are under-
stood prescientifically- the extension of the vernacular term 'body', one is 
tempted to say. 28 
The theory of Newton's Principia has to its credit many empirical successes, 
many of these described in the same pages by Newton himself. Moreover, the 
folk-theoretical kind body plays a ubiquitous role in the development of the 
science. Thus, it cannot be concluded that it is generally true that successful 
science cannot be based on kinds that are really accessible to us prior to theoreti-
cal articulation. Let us return to the example of economics. It now seems most 
unlikely that its difficulties in satisfactorily connecting up with observed 
phenomena can be blamed on the centrality of the kind commodity. The example 
from physics shows that there is nothing wrong in principle with having a science 
of some things or phenomena that are individuated prescientifically. We still seem 
to be left with a puzzle about why the impressive theoretical framework of eco-
nomics is so difficult to apply to the world successfully. 
It might be objected at this point that my treatment of body in the Principia 
was too hasty and that the conclusions drawn are too strong. Perhaps Newton 
does begin with a folk-theoretic kind, but in the course of developing his theory, 
it might be that the concept body also develops. Perhaps, by the end, the charac-
teristic scientific enterprises of generalizing and systematizing leave behind a 
concept that is at some remove from the common notion of body. Perhaps when 
we look at the entire Principia in context, and not just at isolated passages as I 
have done above, we can discover ways in which body evolves from a folk-
scientific concept into a concept that is almost as plainly theoretical as quark is. 
If so, we should consider the possibility that the source of the empirical differ-
ences between Newtonian mechanics and economics can be located here. Newto-
nian mechanics may owe its predictive and explanatory successes with bodies or-
dinarily conceived to its employment of a more highly developed, idealized 
version of the folk concept to model or represent the actual objects. I shall call 
such an idealized concept a refinement of a folk-theoretic or pretheoretic con-
cept. 29 the refined theoretical concepts often turn out to be surprising or coun-
terintuitive to those not sufficiently familiar with the theories and the problems 
they were meant to solve. The objects and properties that these new concepts in-
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volve are also usually further removed from straightforward observability than 
those involved by folk concepts. For instance, impetus and heaviness, almost sen-
sually determined kinds, are refined into momentum and mass. On the face of it, 
scientific progress is characterized by improvements in prediction, explanation, 
and intelligibility that are all made possible by the refinement first of folk-
scientific concepts, and then by the successive refinement of more sophisticated 
concepts. 
If this is right, then the symmetry between body and commodity would be bro-
ken if Newtonian mechanics provided a refinement of body, but economics failed 
to refine the folk theoretic commodity. I can briefly indicate to what extent body 
gets refined in the Principia; a complete treatment is difficult because Newton 
himself seems to have been confused about this aspect of the foundation of his 
theory. What is important for this essay, however, is that it is quite clear that, 
contrary to what I have been heretofore supposing, commodity also undergoes 
some surprising refinement in economic theory. The relevant "structural" sym-
metry between physics and economics that I have been exploiting is not, there-
fore, broken by considerations of refinement. 
The most significant refinement of body first explicitly occurs in Corollary IV 
to the famous third law of motion, with the introduction of the concept of the cen-
ter of gravity common to two or more bodies (C 19). When applying the theory 
to determine actual trajectories, tensions, and so on, almost all calculations are 
performed using the device of centers of gravity (today we quite properly prefer 
to speak of centers of mass) and not with the surfaces of the bodies themselves. 
When calculating we often treat systems of bodies as single bodies, all of whose 
mass is concentrated in a single point of space, the center of gravity of the system. 
The "body" so obtained is plainly not a real body at all in the ordinary sense. Even 
the center of gravity of a single body (what modern texts call a point mass) is not 
an ordinary body'- it occupies only one dimensionless point of space. 30 Without 
at least this refinement of body, it is hard to see how Newtonian mechanics could 
yield any empirically useful results at all. 
If economics were unable to offer an analogous refinement of its central-kind 
term, we might naturally suspect that this was the root of the difficulties with ob-
taining good quantitative results. But there does seem to be a strong analogy be-
tween economics and Newtonian mechanics with respect to refinements. Just as 
powerful mathematical techniques cannot be applied directly to unrefined fea-
tures of bodies, the technical apparatus of economics (the most powerful being 
associated with GET) cannot cope with the complexity of the unrefined concept 
of commodity. One complexity that can be made to appear obvious has to do with 
the overwhelming variety of commodities in any modern economy. Part of our 
economic behavior as consumers involves making choices among avocados, 
bananas, cucumbers, dates, eggplants, figs, etc., and that is only for produce. 
Then there are economic decisions among airline tickets, boat cruise tickets, ca-
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noe rentals, dog sled rentals, elevated train tokens, etc., for transportation. These 
lists can be extended almost indefinitely, and there are almost indefinitely many 
more lists to be constructed. Even if a consumer did have a well-defined utility 
function for this vast array of commodities, there would be no practical hope of 
discovering what it was. If we experimented on a particular person for his entire 
lifetime, we would not have enough data to infer even approximately how his 
choices among bundles containing indefinitely many commodities were struc-
tured. But there are methods for coping with this situation. 
In the first place, economists almost never attempt to predict or explain the be-
havior of particular consumers. Instead, the unit of analysis is a "representative" 
or "average" consumer, whose properties are constructed from data about entire 
markets that is often plentiful and reliable. Since such a representative individual 
(call him R) is a fiction, we must think of what he consumes as also something 
less than fully tangible. This is already beginning the process of refinement. A 
second sort of refinement takes place when we begin to study the hypothetical be-
havior of R. If R's utility function is to be subject to standard mathematical max-
imization techniques, its potentially indefinite list of variables (commodities) 
need to be aggregated into a manageably small list. We might, for example, take 
R's utility to be a function of three variables: food, shelter, and entertainment. 
Each of the three categories is understood to comprise the appropriate specific 
commodities that R is, or might be, confronted with, like avocados, apartment 
rental, and computers. 
Commodities can be aggregated in various ways into variously constructed ag-
gregates. The skillful economist will choose aggregates that make problems of 
interest mathematically tractable. For example, if we are interested in market be-
havior concerning facsimiles of the manuscript of Brahms's Fourth Symphony, 
we may wish to suppose that R's utility is a function of two variables: 1) copies 
of the facsimiles, and 2) everything else that R might choose. If we are interested 
in R's choices of investments, we may aggregate all commodities into these two: 
1) things consumed in the first half of R's life, and 2) things consumed in the sec-
ond half of R's life. There is some well-developed theory regulating the condi-
tions under which it is permissible to aggregate commodities. There is, for ex-
ample, Hick's composite commodity theorem that states, " . . . if a group of 
prices move in parallel, then the corresponding group of commodities can be 
treated as a single good [commodity}" (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980, 121). In 
practice, of course, we can only hope that our aggregates do not violate the res-
trictions imposed by Hick's theorem, because we do not have dependable data on 
the pairwise price movements for the whole indefinitely long list of actual com-
modities. But I am presently interested in theoretical refinement. 
The examples I have presented from physics and economics are much more 
complex and subtle than I can indicate here, but I think that these very brief 
sketches suffice to bring out a significant point. In Newton's theory, the ordinary 
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concept of body was refined into something unrecognizable to the untrained 
intellect-the center of gravity. In GET, the ordinary concept of commodity is 
similarly refined, for the "commodities" arising from aggregation are surprisingly 
unfamiliar objects. What manner of thing is everything consumed in the first half 
of a lifetime, or everything except facsimiles of the manuscript of Brahms's Fourth 
Symphony? And it is notoriously difficult to think of a person's generalized capac-
ity to labor as a commodity, something to be bought and sold as though it were 
in principle completely alienable from the laborer. No one would normally have 
occasion to think of such things as these except in the context of a sophisticated 
scientific theory. 31 I mentioned a related refinement earlier, when characterizing 
GET. In GET, a consumer is a thing with a utility function that exchanges, annihi-
lates (i.e., consumes), and helps create (i.e., by supplying labor) commodities. 
We can think of GET's consumer as an extreme refinement of the pretheoretic 
concept of a person or the folk-economic concept of a consumer. It is indeed ex-
treme; GET's consumers are paradigms of what we would ordinarily apply the 
vernacular term 'inhuman' to! Similarly, centers of gravity that are at single points 
of space are good candidates for the vernacular terms 'incorporeal' and 'im-
material'. 
VII 
In the absence of further arguments, it is reasonable to conclude that Newto-
nian mechanics and GET both begin with folk-theoretic kinds and refine these in 
strikingly analogous ways. The difference in empirical applicability cannot be ac-
counted for by differences in the type of refinements the important kinds undergo. 
In this section I want to examine the radical idea that the kind terms of economics 
do not pick out natural kinds in the world. This idea is radical because it suggests 
that economics is essentially different from natural sciences. Successful natural 
sciences produce reliable laws and formulas that can be thought of as expressing 
relationships among natural kinds or relationships among the properties of a 
single natural kind. If there are no economic kinds that are natural, economics 
cannot do this. This way of formulating the problem is not new. A. Rosenberg 
(1983) has written, 
Philosophers have shown that the terms in which ordinary thought and the be-
havioral sciences describe the causes and effects of human action do not de-
scribe "natural kinds," they do not divide nature at the joints. (301-2) 
The predictive weakness of theories couched in intentional vocabulary 
reflects the fact that the terms of this vocabulary do not correlate in a manage-
able way the vocabulary of other successful scientific theories; they don't di-
vide nature at the joints. . . . [Some] insist that we must jettison "folk psy-
chology" and its intentional idiom if we are to hit upon an improvable theory 
in the science of psychology. This choice extends, of course, beyond psychol-
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ogy to all the other intentions sciences, of which economics, with its reliance 
on expectation and preference, is certainly one. (303) 
In this essay, I want to remain neutral as to what philosophers have or have not 
shown about the existence of intentional natural kinds and offer another sort of 
diagnosis of the failure of commodity to pick out a natural kind. Let us return to 
the fact that there is a pretheoretical concept of a body or object and to the assump-
tion (I shall question this assumption in what follows) that there is a pretheoretical 
concept of a commodity. 
Why is there the pretheoretical concept of a body? It is tempting to answer by 
saying it is because there are bodies, and human beings have evolved to be ex-
tremely good detectors of bodies that are roughly their own size. It seems safe 
to conjecture that any mature normal human being will have a concept of body. 
We need to be good at recognizing things that move, can be grasped and thrown, 
can be eaten and mated with, and can forcibly collide with us. One could also ap-
proach the question from the other direction and say with Kant that it is the fact 
of appearances of bodies as spatiotemporal that yields the transcendental ideality 
of space and time as founding the possibility of these appearances. Either way, 
the result is that humans inescapably perceive the world as containing bodies, and 
that fact itself is some kind of evidence for the veracity of these perceptions. New-
tonian mechanics, therefore, has helped itself to a pretheoretical concept that is 
very well suited, perhaps uniquely well suited, to scientific refinement. Now let 
us ask the same question for economics. 
Why is there the pretheoretical concept of a commodity? In one sense, there 
simply isn't one, because it is very unlikely that this concept is universally pos-
sessed in the same way that the concept of body is. We know that there have been 
some societies in which the practice of private ownership is extremely attenuated 
for most items that we would consider commodities. In such a society, these items 
would not be conceived as objects of production or even of exchange. It is even 
unlikely that anything except food would be thought of as being consumed, since 
the practice of leasing whereby time-slices of durable goods are consumed re-
quires a specialized system of strong property rights. Anthropologists could prob-
ably identify the concept of a 'potentially useful portable object', but that is simply 
a body-commodities are not kinds of things for such a society and, a fortiori, 
not natural kinds. It is, I think, questionable whether the concept is pretheoretical 
even in advanced capitalistic economies. By the time one has reached the age at 
which things like paper money, salaries, rents, banking and investment, and so 
on are somewhat comprehensible, one is surely already in possession of a fairly 
substantial economic folk theory. One understands that higher prices mean fewer 
sales, inflation is good for debtors and bad for those with fixed incomes, 
depressed stock prices are bad for pension funds, and so forth. It is not important 
for present purposes to draw a sharp distinction between what is pretheoretical 
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and what is folk theoretical; I merely want to stress the point that whether people 
can recognize commodities as kinds of things, or even individuate them at all, 
is determined by the society and culture that they live in. This does distinguish 
economics from Newtonian mechanics. Economics did not begin, as physics did, 
by helping itself to a ready-made pretheoretical central concept that lent itself to 
successful refinement. 
Now it does not follow from the fact that commodity is not a universally recog-
nized pretheoretic kind that it is not a natural kind after all. In general, it is en-
tirely possible that people not have the right kind of mental equipment to recog-
nize real kinds. In like manner, it does not follow from the simple fact that there 
is a pretheoretic concept of body, that body is a natural kind. But it is. We can 
see this from the fact that lawlike relationships obtain among bodies. Further-
more, the universality of the experience of bodies seems closely related to their 
constituting a natural kind. This property ofuniversality might be a key to under-
standing the status of commodity. 
Suppose that the reason commodities are not universally recognized is that 
there just aren't any of them in some nonpathological human societies. Suppose, 
that is, that insofar as commodities do exist, they are brought into existence by 
virtue of some distinctive properties of some societies. (I shall consider some 
points that may count against these suppositions below.) Now consider that an in-
tuitively extremely plausible condition on something's being a scientific law is 
that it be universal, that it apply to all the things in its domain. 32 Newtonian 
mechanics applies to all bodies, electrochemistry applies to all solutions, and so 
on. Does GET-based economics have this kind of universality? This question can-
not be answered until it is determined what the domain of the theory is supposed 
to be. If we think of economics as a social science, a science dealing with the eco-
nomic aspects of life in society, then economics is not universal, for we are sup-
posing that there are societies to which it does not apply in virtue of their not hav-
ing any commodities. This is close to the conclusion that economics is not a 
science in the same sense that natural sciences are. 
If economics is taken to have a more modest domain, the economies of modern 
capitalistic societies, for example, then the level of empirical success that the the-
ory enjoys becomes important to the investigation of its foundations. If the theory 
were an extremely good predictor and explainer for the limited domain, then we 
would be inclined to say that modern capitalistic societies are essentially different 
from any others to which the theory does not apply, and that this difference is part 
of what makes them appropriate objects of scientific economic inquiry. If, how-
ever, we are prepared to admit that the theory cannot be applied with great suc-
cess even to a specially chosen domain, then I think we should be less inclined 
to see a deep divide between modern capitalistic societies and other human socie-
ties. If there is no such divide, and if all the other suppositions I have been enter-
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taining are well founded, then economics is not universal and does not express 
relations among natural kinds and their properties. This is stronger than claiming 
that economics sometimes gets it more or less right (when applied to modern 
capitalistic societies) and sometimes gets it wrong (when applied to other socie-
ties). It is claiming that economics never gets it really right because commodity 
is not a natural kind. If commodities are not natural kinds in any society, there 
cannot be an empirical science about them. If I am right, we should not think of 
economics as a false theory about things that are in the world; its lack of success 
is, instead, inevitable because the things that it is supposed to be dealing with are 
not there. 
This powerful conclusion is arrived at with the help of a few assumptions. I 
shall conclude by considering two kinds of interesting objections to the assump-
tions I have made. First, however, I want to point out an objection that won't be 
discussed. It is often asserted (more commonly in conversation than in print) that 
economics is terrifically good at prediction and explanation after all. I think that 
most scholars, even most economists, believe that this is wrong. Applications 
passed off as great successes usually turn out to be either post facto reconstruc-
tions of aggregate data from properties of imaginary representative individuals 
(see Nelson, 1989), or else things readily available to folk economists such as, 
"people buy smaller automobiles when gasoline prices are higher." It is not clear 
how this disagreement can be resolved. 
A more interesting objection comes from combining the assertions that eco-
nomics does tolerably well for modern capitalistic societies, that in principle it 
can do extremely well for these, and that it can, in principle, do extremely well 
for other kinds of societies as well. Some economists, following the prominent 
example of G. Becker, think that virtually all individual, and hence all societal, 
human behavior can be understood by means of GET-based economics. They 
presumably think that this is the case even when the members of the society do 
not conceive their actions. within this framework. Empirical work on precapitalis-
tic societies has been initiated, and some of it is very interesting even though it 
is far from convincing. (C. Dahlman's 1981 treatment of the feudal English open 
field system is a good example). As with economic studies of contemporary socie-
ties, we cannot determine a priori that surprisingly good empirical results are not 
forthcoming at some future date. We seem to be in store for a long wait. 
Another related, but stronger objection could be mounted if we could discover 
some naturalistic foundation for commodity. Such a foundation might be provided 
by psychology in the way indicated above on pp. 108-9. (See Nelson 1986 for 
some details.) It might be true of the cognitive faculties of human beings that they 
include something representable by a utility function and that economic behavior 
(perhaps narrowly, perhaps broadly construed) is partially caused by a process 
representable as the maximization of this function. Another way to demonstrate 
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that commodities are natural kinds, despite the argument of this essay, would be 
to bypass psychology and go straight to biology. It is undeniable that human be-
ings have in common certain biological needs, like nutrition and shelter, and that 
there are various choices among strategies to be implemented in attempting to 
meet these needs. In response to the selectional pressures these needs place upon 
the species, humans might have evolved specialized neurological structures that 
compute what the efficient courses of need-satisfying action are. These neurologi-
cal structures might turn out to have accurate descriptions in the language of eco-
nomics; they might realize utility functions, for example. In this way, economic 
theory might turn out to be in our genes. One striking thing about both of these 
proposals is that the utility function or the preferences replace commodity as the 
fundamental concept in the theory. If there is a sense in which human minds or 
brains actually unconsciously compute utility maxima, then this phenomenon can 
be directly studied with the help of psychology or neurology. What commodities 
there actually are becomes a practical, not a theoretical issue. Of course, there 
may be a further "transcendental'' argument from our having utility functions to 
there being commodities, like the argument from the appearances we have to the 
existence of bodies. This would give commodities a sort of ontological priority 
to utility, but the investigation of this connection between commodity and utility 
would not be part of economics, it would be part of biology. 
It must be conceded that these possibilities that commodity would turn out to 
be a natural kind are remote. And few economists show any interest in pursuing 
them. Still, careful scientific investigation might reveal one of these possibilities 
to be the truth. It is, however, sometimes open to philosophers to argue about 
what is and is not possible given what we presently know. 
In view of the extreme claims made on all sides about economics, I think that 
the position I have argued for in this essay can be considered moderate. I have 
tried to show that there is nothing incoherent or wrongheaded about thinking that 
the central-kind terms of economics pick out natural kinds. But if they are, then 
we are committed to an interpretation of the concepts connected with the kind 
terms as having explanatory force. We are committed to what I called the Utility-
as-Explanatory interpretation. When conjoined with the fact that economics has 
a poor empirical record, however, this interpretation has the consequence that 
commodity, and along with it the other key concepts in the theory, is not a natural 
kind. Since physics, chemistry, biology, and closely related disciplines contain 
lawlike relationships among natural kinds and their properties, this fact about 
economics distinguishes it from these "natural" sciences. After studying other so-
cial sciences and other approaches to economics in the way that GET-based eco-
nomics has been studied in this essay, we might arrive at the same conclusion 
about them. If so, we would be closer to understanding the peculiar scientific sta-
tus of the social sciences. 
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Notes 
1. My own, apparently unpopular, view is that insofar as vernacular "natural"-kind terms have 
a class of referents tidy enough to merit the title "extension" (quite unlikely, I think), this extension 
is very different from the extension of the corresponding scientific term. For example, I think that 
the semantic properties of the vernacular term 'water' differ considerably from the chemical term 'wa-
ter'. These positions are strongly argued for in Donnellan (1983, 85ff.): 
. . . the terms obviously are not borrowed from the vocabulary of science and were part of Eng-
lish long before the advent of modern science .... [a]lthough one might suppose that if terms 
for natural kinds are to be found anywhere the language of science would be replete with them, 
it is not obvious that the Kripke-Putnam theory is applicable to kind terms in science. Nor is it 
obvious that it will apply to terms which the vernacular has borrowed from the language of 
science .... 
I shall just assume in this essay that there are natural kinds of things in the world, but I really only 
need the notion as a tool for analyzing particular scientific theories. Little depends on the metaphysical 
stance adopted toward the kinds. In particular, the argument does not require that natural kinds are 
ontologically prior to scientific laws. 
2. I shall not argue here that economics is not as empirically successful as physics is. The claim 
seems to require enumeration of cases more than argumentation anyway. For the view of an important 
economist see Leontief (1971). A philosophical treatment of the relative success of economics and 
the physical sciences is in Rosenberg (1989). 
3. Anything that cannot be put into the GET framework is usually regarded as suspect eco-
nomics. (Economists disagree among themselves about this to some extent.) The situation is similar 
to that in classical mechanics in the nineteenth century. Any physical theory that was not somehow 
a part of, or reducible to, classical mechanics did not clearly count as physics. Even a "nonmechani-
cal" domain like electromagnetism is subsumed by virtue of the forces it describes figuring as compo-
nents in F =ma. A good example of the generality of GET is it applicability to parts of Marxian eco-
nomics in Roemer (1981). For a discussion of the problem of fitting macroeconomics into GET see 
Weintraub (1979). 
4. My exposition of this material is unusual, but its economic content is based on Arrow and 
Hahn (1971), the book that H. Varian calls one of the two "definitive modern treatments" and "the 
most up to date treatment" of systematic GET (1984, 210, 211). 
5. The intuitive idea is that different bundles of commodities are ordered according to prefer-
ences the consumer has for one bundle over another: Arrow and Hahn write of "levels of satisfaction" 
(1971, 80), and Varian uses the phrase "the consumer thinks that the bundle xis at least as good as 
the bundle y" (1984, 80). But economists often wish to dispense with such psychological terminology 
as I explain in what follows. 
6. It is often convenient' (and will be in this essay) to think of the order given by the consumer's 
preferences as inducing an indifference map. An indifference map is a set of indifference curves in 
Rn (where n is the number of commodities in the economy), each of which contains points in the space 
of commodity bundles that "occupy the same place in the preference order" -the consumer is "indiffer-
ent" to any two points on the same indifference curve. 
7. Any set of consistent preferences, preferences that are transitive, can be represented by some 
utility function-by brute force if necessary. Not every consistent preference map will be represent-
able by a well-behaved function. Lexicographic preferences, for example, cannot be represented by 
a continuous utility function. 
8. This is the place where most of the ideological, noneconomic content of the theory is in-
troduced. The concept of an endowment entails a far-reaching theory of property rights. I shall have 
more to say about this later. 
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9. See Stigler (1965, 84-144) for a summary of the relevant history. 
10. See Coats (1976, 50-59), Schumpeter (1954, 1056-61), and Stigler (1965, 144-48, 151-55) 
for a summary of the relevant history. 
11. As is usual in the history of science, the first fully satisfactory treatment was prefigured in 
various ways; Allen and Hicks did not invent ordinal utility theory, but they found a statement of it 
that made a clean break with the cardinal theory possible. For some historical details, see Schumpeter 
(1954, 1062-66) and Samuelson (1974, especially the appendix). 
12. SARP requires, roughly, that the consumer's choices not violate a transitivity condition. For 
details, see Samuelson (1938b and 1950). 
13. It is only a suggestion. It would not be inconsistent to adopt the formalism of revealed prefer-
ence for its formal virtues and still interpret the theory as being about cardinal utilities. 
14. The import of this historical episode has various interpretations. Rosenberg (1981) argues that 
psychological facts disconfirmed the economic theory and that subsequent developments were un-
justifiable, ad hoc attempts to save the theory. Cooter and Rappoport (1984) think that economists' 
interests shifted away from the welfare economics that required interpersonal comparisons towards 
more theoretical concerns. 
15. Samuelson here refers to marginal rates of substitution. 
16. In particular, this interpretation tells us to ignore the (disastrous) possibility that preferences 
change over time. A consumer who behaves as if his preferences change is considered irrational and, 
therefore, not subject to the theory. 
17. Given the additional, not terribly ad hoc, assumption that Pluto was once a satellite of Nep-
tune's. For a brief account of the history of Bode's law see Holton and Roller (1958, 198-201). For 
Balmer's formula and the Bohr model, see Holton and Roller (607-33). 
18. Bode's law does not fail to be a real law because of a conceptual flaw; it seems that we can 
imagine a universe constructed along Keplerian lines in which it falls out of other cosmological facts. 
Its success is simply accidental. Accidental successes of this magnitude demand searches for underly-
ing mechanisms; in this case the search was soon shown to be futile. 
19. For more details and a defense of this kind of procedure against methodologically inspired 
objections, Nelson (1986) must be consulted. 
20. Both alternatives involve surprising complications. For a discussion of the former, see Nelson 
(1986); for the latter, Nelson (1984, and 1989). 
21. An analogous situation arises in the theory of the firm. Production functions contain factors 
of production as independent variables. Should money be included as a factor of production? One 
might think not because the physical money, the bank notes and coins, do not help produce output. 
One might shovel notes into the furnace along with a genuine factor of production like coal, but this 
would be similar to a consumer's using the notes as wallpaper to get utility. If, however, one thinks 
that production functions, like utility functions, are descriptive and not explanatory, then it seems that 
economists should use dependent variables resulting in the functions that best fit observed 
phenomena-and these probably will include money. See Sinai and Stokes (1981) and the references 
listed there for a sample of the literature. 
22. See, for example, Van Fraassen (1980). 
23. Later, I shall question whether there really is a good pretheoretical notion of a commodity. 
24. For discussion, see Stich (1983). 
25. Experimental studies show that modem, well-educated people have generally poor physical 
intuitions about basic mechanical processes (McCloskey 1983). We do need a theory to tell us what 
are natural kinds of motions. 
26. Again, see McCloskey (1983) for a review of the old physics and for some psychological ex-
periments supporting the claim that this is indeed the folk physics of mechanics. 
27. Corpore is used in two ways by Newton. It usually means some particular body, but it can 
also mean matter or what makes up bodies. It appears in both senses in Definition I, one line apart! 
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"It is this quantity that I mean hereafter everywhere under the name of body [coiporis] or mass. And 
the same is known by the weight of each body [coiporis] ... "(Cajori 1934 [1726], l [I shall refer 
to this book as "C'1; Koyre and Cohen 1972 [1726], 1:40). The first sense predominates and I won't 
discuss the second here. M. Jammer seems to suggest that Galileo struggled with the distinction 
(1961, 52). 
28. The primary vernacular sense is, of course, as in the bodies of animate creatures (coipore 
in Latin). The Oxford English Dictionary, however, suggests that this sense is very close to the sense 
of "material object." Samuel Clarke, writing to Leibniz more or Jess on behalf of Newton, suggests 
that we understand bodies and their interactions on the model of the interaction between our own bod-
ies and our minds (or God). (Alexander, ed., 1956 [1717], 116-17). 
29. It is not necessary here to give an analysis of what I am calling refinement. It is, perhaps, 
related to Toulmin's account of the evolution of concepts (1972, 200-36). 
30. So the folk concept body is implicitly refined in the very first corollary, "A body, acted on 
by two forces simultaneously, will describe the diagonal of a parallelogram . . . " (C 14) because 
a parallelogram and its diagonal are mathematical and not physical figures. Only a center of gravity 
could describe a line; an actual body would describe a solid wormlike figure. I think that this Jack 
of expository precision on Newton's part indicates that he was not clear in his own mind about the 
distinction between the folk notion body and its refinement. It is interesting to note that the same 
refinement is employed when Newton discusses the arcs that planets describe. 
31. There are, of course examples of more familiar aggregates, such as food, but if a utility func-
tion has many arguments at this familiar level of aggregation, calculation again becomes impossible. 
32. The intuitive idea seems reasonably clear, although it is notoriously difficult to state clearly. 
"Applying to everything in its domain" is different from being "exceptionless." A Jaw has an exception 
if it applies to something, but gets at least one thing wrong about it. Really wanting ice cream might 
be lawfully related to trying to get ice cream, although there are many exceptions-some external 
phenomenon may intervene before the wanter manages to try. But we might agree that everyone who 
is a wanter will be a tryer unless there is intervention. So the relation might be universal without being 
exceptionless. 
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